0.9. HAWKS, DOVES AND EVOLUTIONARY GAMES xxiii 0.9 Hawks, Doves and evolutionary games 1. In the hawk-dove game, if C=10 and V=6, what will the there proportion of hawks? 2. Say up have the payoff matrix below for Axelrod's tournament. Choose three strategies. (a) choose three strategies from the following list • Tit for Tat (TfT) • Cooperate all the time (C) OR defect all the time (D) • Alternate starting with C (AC) OR with (AD) • Start C, then play the most common strategy played by the other in the last three moves (M3) • Defect first then copy the other (DTfT) • Any strategy you make up (b) Using and the payoff matrix the tables below, generate the payoffs for the round-robin tournament for 8-round contests. (c) Identify the winner based on equal populations shares (d) Which strategy gave most points to the winner? (e) would the strategy that gave most points to the winner increase or decrease it's population share in an evolutionary game? (f) Would the winner do as well with the population adjusted as in the previous question? Why is this observation important?xxiv Defect Cooperate Cooperate 0, 6 4, 4 Defect 1, 1 6, 0 ACTIONS Strat! > round gets plays plays gets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total ACTIONS Strat! > round gets plays plays gets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total0.9. HAWKS, DOVES AND EVOLUTIONARY GAMES xxv Defect Cooperate Cooperate 0, 6 5, 5 Defect 1, 1 6, 0 ACTIONS Strat! > round gets plays plays gets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total ACTIONS Strat! > round gets plays plays gets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total