Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjto20 Download by: [Griffith University] Date: 03 May 2017, At: 17:34 Journal of Sport & Tourism ISSN: 1477-5085 (Print) 1029-5399 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjto20 The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Mega Sport Event Legacies Holger Preuss To cite this article: Holger Preuss (2007) The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Mega Sport Event Legacies, Journal of Sport & Tourism, 12:3-4, 207-228, DOI: 10.1080/14775080701736957 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14775080701736957 Published online: 04 Dec 2010. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 6129 View related articles Citing articles: 143 View citing articles The Conceptualisation and Measurement of Mega Sport Event Legacies Holger Preuss This paper focuses on the legacy of mega sport events. First, the concept of legacy is defined before the problems of measuring and forecasting legacy are discussed. Benchmarking and the use of macro data do not correctly reveal legacy. Hence a bottom-up approach is introduced which identifies the event legacy by evaluation of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ eventrelated changes in a host city. These changes are defined as ‘event-structures’ (infrastructure, knowledge, image, emotions, networks, culture). Many of them change the quality of location factors of the host city in the long-term. The benefits/costs through the transformation of the host city are the legacy of a mega sport event. Here a particular focus is put on tourism legacy. Introduction The literature shows that much has been written about the legacies of mega sport events, but a clear definition of legacy is missing. Furthermore, the lack of agreement on the concept of legacy and its various elements makes it very hard to measure accurately or with confidence. Therefore, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that ever more cities compete to bid for big events, and base many aspects of their development on so-called ‘event strategies’ (Ha ¨ußermann & Siebel, 1993), with only a vague idea about the complexity of event legacy and its uncertain nature. As such, this ‘festivalisation of city politics’ (Ha ¨ußermann & Siebel, 1993) should be subjected to a greater interrogation, by citizens, politicians and academics, than is currently the case. Mega events bear the risk of creating huge cost overruns and not all legacies are positive, nor can they be entirely planned (Ha ¨ußermann & Simons, 2000, p. 71). Notwithstanding this, politicians follow ‘event strategies’, because mega events can also spread a general spirit of optimism, create combined visions, attract exogenous resources and accelerate city development. Holger Preuss is at the Institute of Sport Science, Johannes Gutenberg-Universita ¨t Mainz, Germany. Email: [email protected] Journal of Sport & Tourism Vol. 12, Nos. 3–4, August–November 2007, pp. 207–227 ISSN 1477-5085 (print)/ISSN 1029-5399 (online) # 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14775080701736957 The aim of this paper is to structure the research done on event legacy and to offer a systematicdefinition and concept of what legacy is. Furthermore, a detailed look at the dimensions of event legacy will be provided. Identifying the dimensions of legacy is the groundwork for a first overall attempt to measure it. As a starting point, previous methods of investigating event legacy will be reviewed. The following two measures have been most common: 1. Legacy determined by benchmarking—based on past experiences from other mega events. This measure is often used to forecast legacy during the planning stage. 2. Legacy determined by macro-economic indicators. This measure is often used expost to find evidence for legacies. It will be argued that both measures are flawed, and as a potential alternative a bottom-up approach is suggested. This approach measures all ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ structural changes through a mega event, called ‘event-structures’ (see Table 1 later). When ‘event-structures’ change the location factors (supply side) in a city, any activity based on these changes is the event legacy. Based on such supply side changes, this paper will suggest a basic strategy to build up and strengthen tourism location factors, thus focusing on the tourism legacy. This paper will also address the difficulties arising in the measurement of event legacy. In particular, the re-distribution of activity and funding in the host city which creates opportunity costs and various crowding-out effects due to overheating of particular sectors in the host city. Towards a Definition of Legacy The staging of mega sport events has almost always required the development of new infrastructure. Furthermore, often the infrastructure cannot sufficiently be used after the event. As the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976 provided a very high profile example of this, it is surprising that a serious academic interest in this area has only developed over the last 15 years, with what appears to have been the first paper on tourism legacy from cultural and sport events produced by Roche in 1992. However, in the past ten years academic analyses of mega sport events and legacy have increased significantly (see Figure 1). Table 1 ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Event-structures ‘soft’ structures ‘hard’ structures Knowledge: e.g. organizational, security, technological Primary structure: sport infrastructure, training sites Networks: e.g. political, sport federations, security Secondary structure: villages for athletes, technical officials and media Cultural goods: e.g. cultural identity, cultural ideas, common memory Tertiary structure: Security, power plants, telecommunication networks, cultural attractions 208 H. Preuss It is interesting that it is rarely the sport legacy that is stressed in discussions about legacy, but the economic andtourism legacies. However, no satisfying definition of any type of ‘legacy’ is available. One reason may be that legacy is often assumed to be selfevident, so that there is no need to define precisely what it is (Cashman, 2005, p. 15). Etymologically the word legacy means ‘property left by will’ (Harper, 2001). Looking at the literature about the legacy of sport events, this definition is not satisfactory for two reasons: first, a property belongs to someone, while an event ‘leftover’—such as an improved tourism image or knowledge in serving tourists—is not the property of the event organisers, nor is it that of politicians or a sport governing body. In fact some legacies (e.g. positive tourism image) might perhaps best be described as a public good. Second, the legacy of mega sport events can also not be intended to be left ‘by will’. Examples are oversized sport arenas or a socially unjust distribution of public money. Mega events also have legacies that were not planned, for example all externalities. Therefore, the etymological definition of ‘legacy’ does not fit the context in which it is used in event literature. Event legacy, as used by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), captures the value of sport facilities and public improvements turned over to communities or sports organisations after the Olympic Games. The legacy includes a ‘legacy-fund’ for ongoing operations of sports facilities and venues. This ‘legacy-fund’ is an important feature because the required event facilities, for example luge tracks developed for Winter Olympic Games, are often not economically sustainable and need ongoing operating subsidies (Fuller & Clinch, 2000; Thorpe, 2002, p. 13). However, this definition seems to be narrow in comparison to the various concepts of legacy mentioned in the literature. Examples range from commonly recognised aspects (urban planning, sport infrastructure) to less recognised intangible legacies such as urban regeneration, enhanced international reputation, increased tourism, improved public welfare, additional employment, more local business opportunities, better corporate relocation, opportunities for city marketing, renewed community spirit, better inter-regional cooperation, production of ideas, production of cultural Figure 1 Number of hits to articles written about mega sport events and legacy. Journal of Sport & Tourism 209 values, popular memory, opportunities for education, emotional experience and additional know-how. These positive legacies stand in contrast to negative legacies such as debts from construction, high opportunity costs, unneeded infrastructure, temporary crowding-out, loss of permanently returning tourists, increases of property rental, socially unjust displacement and re-distributions (Ritchie & Aitken, 1984; Haxton, 2000; Lenskyj, 2000, 2002; Moragas et al., 2003; Kasimati, 2003; Preuss, 2004; Cashman, 2005; Vigor et al., 2005; Kesenne, 2005; O’Brien, 2006; Smith & Fox, 2007). In 2000, the IOC launched a project called the ‘Olympic Games Global Impact’ (OGGI). This project was initiated in order to improve the evaluation of the overall impacts of the Olympic Games on the host city, its environment and its citizens, as well as to propose a consistent methodology to capture the Games effects. It covers a period of 11 years, from the bidding stage to two years after the hosting of the Olympics. The focus is put on the economic, social and environmental sustainability of the Olympic Games measured by several indicators (Furrer, 2002; IOC, 2006). However, the model ends two years after the Games, and this is clearly too early to measure legacy adequately. Being aware of the importance of sustainable changes to a host city, the IOC initiated a congress on ‘The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984–2000’ in 2002. It attempted to define legacy, but the participants: ...found that there are several meanings of the concept, and some of the contributions have highlighted the convenience of using other expressions and concepts that can mean different things in different languages and cultures. (Moragas et al., 2003, p. 491) Cashman adds to the hesitancy about a definition of legacy. He argues that use of the poorly defined word ‘legacy’ is elusive, problematic and even dangerous for a number of reasons: When the term is used by organising committees, it is assumed to be entirely positive, there being no such thing as negative legacy when used in this context. Secondly, it is usually believed that legacy benefits flow to a community at the end of the Games as a matter of course. (Cashman, 2005, p. 15) Cashman (2005) collected a variety of evidence about legacies and categorised them in six fields: (1) sport; (2) economics; (3) infrastructure; (4) information and education; (5) public life, politics and culture; and (6) symbols, memory and history. Another similar classification of legacies was done by Chappelet (2006). He distinguishes (1) sporting legacy; (2) economic legacy; (3) infrastructural legacy; (4) urban legacy; and (5) social legacy. However, these rather qualitative definitions need a broader perspective. Considering legacy in the widest possible terms, and independent from qualitative examples or IOC suggestions, five dimensions of legacy are suggested. 1. The degree of planned/unplanned structure. For example, planned tourism structure is the extension of tourism attractions (museums, etc) while a bomb attack is unplanned but can spoil the tourism image of a location. 210 H. Preuss 2. The degree of positive/negative structure. This dimension is highly ambivalent. For example, a positive legacy for the tourism industry may be a negative legacy for the environment. The classification of a legacy is a valuation that may address the stakeholders in a negative or positive way. 3. The degree of tangible/intangible structure. For example, the increased number of inbound tourists is tangible, while the image of an attractive tourist destination is intangible. 4. The duration and time of a changed structure. Some structures and effects of an event can occur in the years before the event (what Weed, 2008, calls the ‘pregnancy’ effect). For example, a pre-Games increase of congress and business tourism. The duration of legacy can be very long (e.g. the infrastructure) or rather short (e.g. the cultural festivals initiated around the sport event). 5. The space affected by changed structure. For example, the city centre of the Olympic Games host city often benefits more from image and re-urbanisation than other locations in the city, state or country. Derived from the above, the following definition of legacy is proposed: Irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sport event that remain longer than the event itself. It is possible totake the firstthreedimensionsof legacyoutlinedabove toform a ‘Legacy cube’ (Figure 2). The legacycubehaseight smallercubes. A holisticevaluation of a mega sport event would be necessary to identify all legacies. However, most pre-event studies and bid committees focus on only one subcube (planned, positive, tangible) (Cashman, 2005,p.15).Manyofthepre-eventfeasibilityandeconomicimpactstudiesthatconsider legacies are potentially biased, because the ambition of those commissioning the studies is to favour the hosting of the event and therefore only emphasise this particular subcube. This issue has been widely discussed by authors investigating sport events Figure 2 Legacy cube. Journal of Sport & Tourism 211 (Mills,1993;Crompton,1995;Kesenne,1999;Porter,1999;Preuss,2000;Baade&Matheson, 2002; Szymanski, 2002; Kasimati, 2003; Cashman, 2005). The legacy cube can only be evaluated for a particular time and space (dimensions 4 and 5). As such, if the legacy for a whole country is required, several legacy cubes need to be considered for different times and spaces. Furthermore, the five dimensions discussed above only measure ‘gross’ legacy. In other words, these dimensions can only evaluate the event legacy of a static and empty place in which no other development is taking, or would have taken, place. Therefore, two other aspects need to be considered for a valuation of a ‘net’ mega event legacy. 1. Re-distributions: when measuring the ‘net’ event legacy, the alternative investment of funds, labour, human resources etc, need to be considered (opportunity costs). Withoutstagingthemegaevent,thesameresourceswouldhavecreatedotherbenefits (another legacy). An example is that a mega event attracts tourists, but instead of investing in stadiums and other tourism infrastructure, the same money could have been invested in integration projects that indirectly reduce crime and also make a city more attractive for tourists. The long-term development of the site has to be considered as being the alternative development. For example, if a city attracts 10% more tourists due to the event but the average tourism increase prior to the Games was 7% per year, the ‘net’ tourism legacy is only an increase of 3%. 2. Crowding-out: when measuring the ‘net’ event legacy, the benefits that cannot be activated due to limited capacities have to be deducted from the event legacy. For example, if a tourist attraction usually has an occupancy rate of 100%, the additional 5% event-related tourists do not attract extra income, due to crowding-out of 5% of the ordinary visitors. The Measurement of Event Legacies Studies of mega sport events often measure the economic impact or those impacts that are related to economics. Many of them are dedicated to event tourism (Getz, 1989, 1991; Hall, 1992; Kang & Perdue, 1994; Carvalhedo, 2003; Dwyer et al., 2004; Chalip & McGuirty, 2004; Solberg & Preuss, 2006). Other studies focus on employment impacts (Ritchie, 1984, 1996; Burns et al., 1986; Mules & Faulkner, 1996; Hotchkiss et al., 2001; Hagn & Maennig, 2007) and urban development (Evans, 1995; Hughes, 1993; Meyer-Ku ¨nzel, 2001). Most studies also mention environmental (May, 1995) and social impacts (Shultis et al., 1994; Hodges & Hall, 1996; Lenskyj, 2002; Fredline et al., 2003; Misener & Mason, 2006; Smith & Fox, 2007). The measurement of legacy has to consider all changes caused by a mega event over time. Most often, the economic impact is measured because it is tangible and needed for political justification of investing scarce public resources in an event. To be precise, the meaning of the word ‘impact’ has to be distinguished from the meaning of ‘legacy’. The impact is caused by a short-term impulse, for example, an exogenous shock (e.g. consumption of event visitors) to the economy directly through the event. Although economic mega event impacts are strong, they are 212 H. Preuss short-term and therefore not a legacy. The economic legacy, however, is all additional economic activity based on greater productivity due to changes in the host cities’ location factors (e.g. post-event tourism due to increased interest in the event city). Long-term economic growth requires a constant influx of autonomous money. This can only be reached if the mega event has changed the host city’s structure. Therefore, politicians should use the mega event to ‘piggy-back’ structural changes that improve the host cities’ location factors. For example, this could be the upgrade of tourism infrastructure (museums, promenades, hotels, etc) as seen in Barcelona’s successful transformation to a world-class tourism destination through the Olympics in 1992 (Sananhuja, 2002). Chalip (2000) emphasised the necessity to leverage the legacy effect to justify public investments in infrastructure. However, Ritchie (2000) goes further and talks about the need to ‘embed’ an event in the broader processes of city development. Both authors stress planning the legacy before an event is staged, but Faber Maunsell (2004, p. 55) suggests starting even earlier: ‘Commitment and funding for legacy need to be in place when planning the event’. Having established the nature of legacy and its relationship to impacts, this paper now turns to a consideration of the two most commonly used approaches in measuring event legacies, the benchmark approach and the top-down approach. The Benchmark Approach to Measuring Event Legacies The literature shows that the legacies of events are multifaceted, dynamic and depend on local and global factors. Most publications only describe single event legacies or, at best, focus on only one or two legacies (Cashman, 2005, p. 18). But evenwith scientific evidence for a particular legacy its close reproduction by another event is highly unlikely (Solberg & Preuss, 2006). Therefore, the benefit of the IOC’s project OGGI to forecast future legacies might be low, although OGGI promises: ...to assist bidding cities and future Olympic Games Organisers, through the transfer of strategic direction obtained from past and present Olympic Games, to identify potential legacies and thereby maximise the benefits of their Olympic Games; and to create a comparable benchmark across all future Olympic Games. (IOC, 2006) The legacy cube (Figure 2) contains different legacies for different spaces (cities), mega events and times. Therefore it is very difficult to predict event legacy: Events, unlike manufacturing or service operations, are by definition unique to the location in which they are held, and strictly temporary, and therefore an assessment of their [...] long-term impacts is fraught with uncertainties, multiple variables and subjective measures. (Rose, 2002) Consequently, both the complexity of an event and its uniqueness devalue case studies of previous mega events as best practice (benchmark) for measuring event legacies. Figure 3 presents a matrix of potential comparisons; however each of these comparisons is problematic, as noted below. Journal of Sport & Tourism 213 Same Event in Same City The same event creates different legacies if staged twice in one city. Owing to the permanent development of mega events (increasing gigantism, growing global interest, etc) the event requires a different infrastructure when staged in the same city at a subsequent time. Even though much of the infrastructure needed for an event would have been set up during the first staging of the event, other infrastructure, renovations and enlargements are often required for the second time (e.g. Olympic Winter Games in Innsbruck 1964 and 1976 (Schardt, 2006) or FIFA Football World Cup in Germany hosted in 1974 in comparison to 2006). Not only does an event develop over time, but the environment also changes (see Thurow, 2004, pp. 31–56). Accelerated development of the world affects and changes both cities and the requirements for staging mega sport events. Therefore, the same event staged for a second time in the same city requires a different infrastructure. Different Events in Same City Differentevents create different legacies if staged in the same city. Other infrastructural requirements, different social interests, other media exposure, different location requirements, etc, mean each mega sport event will create a unique legacy. However, some legacies of mega events are similar. This is the reason why an ‘event strategy’ can be efficient. Synergistic effects are possible when a legacy of one event is a prerequisite for another event (e.g. sport facilities). Same Event in Different Cities The same event creates different legacies in different cities. Based on the infrastructure of the city and the political targets pursued for the event, the same mega event will Figure 3 Matrix of event comparison. 214 H. Preuss create a different legacy in different locations (Preuss, 2007a). The high degree of freedom in optional activities in order to leverage a particular legacy means the same mega event will create different legacies each time. For example, the Winter Olympics in Innsbruck 1976 positioned the city as a tourist city but did not attract foreign investment in the way that Grenoble did in 1968 (Chappelet, 2006). Similarly, the Olympics in Atlanta 1996 could not reach the same tourism attractiveness as Barcelona 1992. Furthermore, cities have different infrastructure when bidding to stage an event. Therefore, some cities have to build up more infrastructures while others can stage an event without major investments. For example, the Olympic Games in Los Angeles 1984 was staged with relatively minor investments, while Barcelona 1992, Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008 each invested billions of euros in infrastructure (Preuss, 2004). Consequently, these issues highlight that both the uniqueness and complexity of events in a fast changing environment make it difficult to seriously use benchmarks to identify potential legacies of future events. As such, the discussion now turns to the most common alternative to the benchmark approach, the ‘top-down’ approach. The ‘Top-down’ Approach to Measuring Event Legacies Undoubtedly, mega events create a strong economic impact, but they do not necessarily create an economic legacy. However, the peak in demand of an event may change the supply side of the local economy (Baade & Matheson, 2002, p. 145; Solberg & Preuss, 2006). The question is whether these event-related changes in supply lead to additional economic growth. Mills (1992) summarises models that explain metropolitan economic growth. These models are based on theories such as export base, neoclassical growth, cumulative causation or disequilibrium dynamic adjustment. All models use key economic variables to observe growth. However, these models may not be appropriate to measure a mega event impact or its legacy, because mega sport events are a relatively small enterprise compared with the overall economy of most countries (Preuss, 2007b). Legacies are even more difficult to detect, because they are a smaller effect than impact spread over many years. The key economic variables available for a region (such as GDP or employment rates) are too general to show event-based changes (Szymanski, 2002, p. 8). For example, Brenke & Wagner (2007) could only find a very small consumption-based economic impact of the FIFA Football World Cup 2006 in Germany by using macro economic data. In contrast, Preuss et al. (2007) measured, by interviewing 9,546 visitors of the World Cup, an impact seven times that size based on event tourist consumption. A similar empirical evaluation of the World Cup 2002 in Korea and Japan supports this result (Lee & Taylor, 2005). Quite clearly, a difference of this size cannot be accounted for by potential crowding-out effects. However, in this paper, the focus is not on the measurement of economic impact, but of legacy, which is of an undetermined duration. Therefore, event-related changes need to be isolated from general metropolitan development, and this is no easy task Journal of Sport & Tourism 215 (Baade & Matheson, 2002, p. 133). In theory, the economic indicators of a host city need only be compared with the same indicators of the city if the event had not been staged (the so-called ‘without case’) (Hanusch, 1992). The event legacy is the difference between the ‘event case’ and ‘without case’. However, this is a static approach. A better method would be to consider the alternative development the city would have without the event taking place (the so-called ‘control case’) (Hotchkiss et al., 2001, p. 1; Baade & Matheson, 2002, p. 132; Oldenboom, 2006, p. 49). With this approach, the legacy is the difference between the ‘event case’ and the ‘control case’. In practice, the use of this approach is not easy because definitive data for the ‘control case’ are not available because the future of the regional economy in the absence of the event is unknown. However, there are two methods that are commonly used to estimate the ‘control case’. 1. The first method is to collect data for cities with similar structure and size in the same macro economy for a certain period. The average development of the other cities builds the ‘reference case’ (Preuss, 2000, pp. 261–264; Baade & Matheson, 2002, p. 132; Sterken, 2006; Hagn & Maennig, 2007). This statistical tool is called ‘differences-in-differences’ (DD). The idea behind the DD approach is to determine whether some statistic of interest (e.g. price level or employment rate) changed more for the host city during or after the event than for the other cities observed. The event legacy is the difference between the ‘reference cases’ and the ‘event case’. The shortcomings of this method are related to the difficulties in selecting ‘reference cases’ that do not have systematic differences. Heckman & Hotz (1989, pp. 864–865) suggest selecting groups that only differ in having staged the event. They must not differ in other observables and unobservables. Provided that enough data are available, a random-growth model can be used as a robustness check for a DD approach (Hotchkiss et al., 2001, p. 17). However, for event legacy measurement, there is an additional problem. Rarely are a group of host cities available that can be compared with a relatively homogeneous group of other cities. Often there is only one host city available. 2. The second method to predict the ‘control case’ is to look at the growth path of a city – in other words its long-term development. The ‘control case’ can be determined by trend extrapolation. The event legacy would be the difference between the ‘control case (trend)’ and the ‘event case’. The shortcoming of this method is, again, that non-event-related circumstances can deviate from the trend. For example, a catastrophe such as 9/11 or SARS can decrease inbound tourism. The identification of a legacy by using ‘reference cases’ (DD) or ‘growth path (trend)’ is better than guessing, but still highly error-prone. Imagine a mega event creates 800 jobs in the tourism service industry, but the employment decreases by 800 jobs after the event due to a corporation closing a factory in the host city. Both methods would not have detected the real event legacy. The ‘reference case’ model would have shown the same employment rate in all cities because the other cities have not had a factory closing. The ‘growth path (trend)’ method would have set the average unemployment 216 H. Preuss rate as the trend and the employment created through the event would have filled the gap. Baade & Matheson (2002, p. 136) used a complex regression model when trying to determine the employment attributed to the Olympics in 1984 and 1996. They considered external and internal factors to isolate the mega event’s impact and carefully reviewed the history of cities to incorporate each potentially significant change into their model. As a result, they could only find a small transitory economic impact of the Olympic Games from Atlanta 1996 on employment (p. 142). Similar results for Olympic Games were found by Sterken (2006). Baade & Matheson conclude: Diverting scarce capital and other resources from more productive uses to the Olympics very likely translates into slower rates of economic growth than that whichcould be realized in the absence of hosting the Olympic Games. (Baade & Matheson, 2002, pp. 145–146) This statement has to be qualified when looking at the city’s benefit from Olympic Games. First, much of the resources invested in the Olympics come from autonomous exogenous sources and would not be directed to the city without the Games. Second, if no difference to other cities is detected, this can be interpreted in a positive way in that the investment in the Olympics will have been demonstrated to be at least as successful as the investments other cities have made in alternative projects. This indicates that the investments and consumption of event-related autonomous money compensates the difference of all investments in lower productive activities compared to the best alternatives. Third, mega events also have legacies other than direct economic growth. For example, ‘(w)hile the economic impact may be small, the publicity value may be high’ (Szymanski, 2002, p. 9). This stresses that a holistic view of the aims of mega events is necessary (Preuss, 2004). Mega sport events are multidimensional and multipurpose occurrences. Therefore, intangible sporting, recreational, political, psychological, promotional and other aspects have to be considered. These event legacies can also indirectly stimulate the economy in the long-term, and should not be isolated from general development. The ‘Bottom-up’ Approach to Measure Event Legacy The discussions so far suggest that both the benchmark and top-down approaches fail to measure event legacy adequately. As such, it is suggested that a more comprehensive alternative method is an approach that evaluates legacy in a bottom-up manner. In such an approach, all changes of structures due to the event are considered. The approach is based on the long-term development plan for a city. Consequently, the plans for future city development represent the ‘without case’, the city development that will take place without the event. Depending on existing structures, for most cities the staging of a mega event brings with it major changes. Mega events require many specific ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ structures (see Table 1). Furthermore, there are two ‘soft’ event-structures that are built through the momentum of the mega sport event, namely; image and emotions. Despite the supposition that image and emotions are ‘soft’ event-structures they Journal of Sport & Tourism 217 have to be considered in the bottom up approach, because they also change the quality of location factors. Concerning image, for example, the FIFA World Cup has tremendous symbolic significance and can form, re-position or solidify the image of a country. One of the aims of hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup was to reposition the stereotype of Germans as being ‘conformist, time-dominated and serious’ (Lewis, 2006, p. 223). The organisers, government and the Deutsche Zentrale fu ¨r Tourismus eV launched a hospitality initiative on behalf of the German government, which included servicing government resorts, location-marketing for Germany, a cultural program, and a service and friendliness campaign (BMI, 2005, p. 15). As a result, it appears that Germany’s image as was changed to one of being an open and hospitable country, as illustrated in Figure 4. The other event-structure built by momentum is emotion. Mega sport events give politicians a common vision to gain international prestige, citizens are emotionally involved and private industry is inspired by welcoming an extraordinary and worldwide recognised event. The pride of hosting such an event creates local identification, visions and motivation. An example is the Olympic Games in Seoul 1988, which created a national perspective, a feeling of vitality, participation and recognition, and an international perception of being modern and technologically up-to-date (Denis et al., 1988, p. 229). Similarly, the Chinese are keen to demonstrate their place as one of the world’s leading economies through the hosting of the Olympics in Beijing in 2008 (Lin, 2004; Preuss, 2007b). Figure 4 Image of Germany as world-open and hospitably country by foreigners. 218 H. Preuss Event-based Changes in a Mega Event City Aseriousbidforamegasporteventforcesacitytoevaluateitselfandtostrategicallyplan for its future.Feasibilitystudies can provide ideas (and help identify gaps)for future city development, which is a pre-bid legacy. When a city is chosen to stage a mega event, major urban reconstruction is required and affects the host city in four ways. First, there is a risk that scarce resources get redistributed in order to facilitate the preparation of event infrastructure. This can slow down city development and can be considered a negative externality (see Baade & Matheson, 2002, pp. 145–146). The bottom-upapproachwouldnotconsiderthisasanevent-relatedchangebutasanegative legacy. Here, the effect of redistributions of scarce public resources becomes visible. Second, some of the event requirements arepart of the long-term development plan of the city and cannot be considered as a legacy of the event. However, they will be considered by many people to be event-related infrastructure and consequently there may be debate about whether they should be considered as event-related costs (see Preuss, 2004, p. 197). Regardless of this controversy, there are three legacies of the event that are supplementary to the long-term development plan of the city: 1. Often the host city develops faster than it would have had it not hosted the event. On the one hand, accelerated development is a positive legacy, because the city benefits earlier from the infrastructure/event-structures and can better position itself in relation to global competition. On the other hand, accelerated development can inherit the risk of ignoring constraints, lower quality and higher costs. Opposing groups, socially unprivileged or minorities are then often losers, because a narrowed view can fail to be responsive to wider interests and longterm community needs (Mean et al., 2005, pp. 130–131). 2. The consensus of politicians often associated with mega events helps to secure the investment of public resources. On the one hand, this is a positive legacy, because the required infrastructure/event-structures can be financed. On the other hand, the use of scarce resources may slow down the development of non-event-related infrastructure/event-structures. There is the risk that politicians use the idea of hosting an event to justify a project that might not be politically feasible if attempted in the context of everyday politics (Burbank et al., 2001, p. 34). 3. A part of the infrastructure/event-structures will be financed by autonomous resources, such as from the sport federations, the central government or the private sector. The third consideration for hosts of a mega event is the question of whether any infrastructure that is needed for the event but not for the long-term development of the city, should be built temporarily in order to avoid ‘white elephants’. There are constantly conflicts between event requirements and long-term utilisation (Searle, 2002). Furthermore, providing event requirements does not mean that the temporary infrastructure should be of low quality. However, externalities may be created that serve other positive legacies. For example, oversized sport arenas (which may be considered by some to be ‘white elephants’) enable citizens to purchase tickets and Journal of Sport & Tourism 219 therefore create a positive atmosphere and a positive image, which may attract postevent tourists. Fourthly, by analysing the environment, global trends and the particular event infrastructure, the opportunities and risks for the long-term development of the city become visible. This is a positive legacy. Grievances, shortcomings and gaps in the infrastructure of the city are revealed, and as a result these can be embedded in the development strategy. What makes this bottom-up approach complex is that one structure can serve different and conflicting goals. For example, to improve the attractiveness of a city aiming to increase post-event tourism requires significant media coverage, perfect event organisation and impressive sport facilities. However, some facilities might not be needed in the long-term although they may contribute to the improvement of the city’s image, which can be a long-term goal. In this case, a strategy is needed on how to construct the facility in a way to attain a positive image. This is a crucial point in understanding legacy. A positive legacy in one dimension can be a negative legacy in another dimension (see Figure 5). The weakness of this bottom-up approach is, however, that it cannot entirely consider the development of a city without the event. The alternative development of the city is only considered by suggestions derived from the long-term city development plan. ‘Event-structure’ and the Change of ‘Location Factors’ As mentioned above, each mega sport event requires specific ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ structures. All event-structure that is in existence before or after the momentum of Figure 5 Conflicts of positive and negative legacies. 220 H. Preuss the event will change, for a certain period of time, the quality of a location (site) in a positive or negative way. In short, the event-structures change the quality of location factors. A specific set of location factors determines the quality of a site for living, industry, fairs, congresses, events, and also as a site for tourism. Today, mega cities are in global competition to attract economic activity to their city (Sassen, 1996). The question arises as to how mega sport events can develop location factorsthatpositionacitybetterinthisglobalcompetition.Thismaybepossiblebystrategically embedding an event in the broader processes of development (Ritchie, 2000). Figure 6 shows that the strategy of building up event legacy starts with the decision to bid for a specific mega event (1). Each event differs in the structures required and each city differs in the structures available. For example, if a strong tourism legacy is intended, the city should pick an event with high media coverage in its tourism target group. The strategicconsideration is to focus on the additional structures a mega event requires and how these structures satisfy the city’s long-term needs. During the candidature process (2) some required structure (‘obligate measures’) as well as some ‘optional measures’ will be developed. By means of the ‘optional measures’ the bidding committee tries strategically to establish the best possible position in the bid competition (Preuss, 2000; McIntosh, 2003). Therefore, some of these measures may indicate a valuable legacy for the sport federation but may not be sustainable for the city. During the preparation for the event (3) the obligate infrastructure has to be completed. However, to build up a strong legacy, ‘optional measures’ should be embedded to improve those location factors that are needed for the city in the long term. Concerning tourism, this may be building up tourism infrastructure, cultural goods and extending the tourism service industry. During the event (4), all event-structure is present. Additionally, the momentum of the mega event creates Figure 6 Process of building up planned event legacy. Journal of Sport & Tourism 221 emotions and affects the image of the city. (5) Post-event, some of the event-structure vanishes, while most of the structures will exists for a longer or shorter time. Overall, there are six types of event-structure that are usually preserved after a mega event. Four of these—infrastructure, know how, networks and culture—are developed almost as a matter of course through the preparation of the event, whilst a further two—emotions and image—are dependent on the momentum the event develops (Preuss, 2007c, pp. 92–97). Each of these six event-structures transforms the location factors of the host city. For example, the tourism product at a destination is affected by the following event-structures: new physical tourist attractions, upgraded and new hotels, better public transportation, a better and more interesting image, more knowledge in the tourism service industry, a more interesting cultural presentation and cultural identity (see Solberg & Preuss, 2006). Figure 7 shows six aspects of a city that are affected by a change of location factors. In this paper, the focus has been on the tourism product. Note, that a planned legacy to strengthen other aspects of a city requites the implementation of different ‘optional measures’. For example, a better business destination would be developed through event infrastructures such as an upgrade of the general infrastructure (particularly traffic systems), knowledge (e.g. organisational and service skills, security), skilled labour, image as a business location and political and business networks. Increased tourism activity in the city may lead to long-term economic growth and additional jobs (Figure 7). However, such economic growth based on event-related improved ‘location factors’ does not obviously appear in many evaluations as being Figure 7 Impact of event-structure on location eactors and its economic relevance. 222 H. Preuss event-related, and therefore it is difficult to detect and measure, evenwith the bottomup approach. Conclusion The measurement of the legacy of mega sport events is complex. Discussions in this paper have suggested that the most feasible method may be the bottom-up approach; however, the measurement of event legacy has still three obstacles to face. The first is the difficulty in measuring ‘net’ legacy rather than ‘gross’ legacy. Without staging the event the city would invest its resources in alternative projects. The alternative development of the city would createother legacies. Thoseopportunity costs have to be considered if the legacyof a mega sport event is to be used as a political argument for the staging of an event. Additionally, crowding-out effects have to be included in a legacy model. The second obstacle is the difficulty in deciding whether a legacy has a positive or negative value. This does not affect the measurement of a legacy itself, but is concerned with a judgement of its value. The problem is that the same legacy can be positive and negative at the same time. Therefore an evaluation of legacy has to be done based on a welfare function, such as cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analyses have a quantitative and qualitative part considering all tangible and intangible costs and benefits for a defined period of time under a given welfare function. The third problem is the measurement of legacy over time. While the bottom-up approach is able to detect the event legacy, it is difficult to evaluate the legacy effect overtime.Megasporteventlegaciesindirectlystimulatetheeconomyandotheractivities in the host city. In the long-term the legacy effect cannot be isolated from the general developmentofthecity.Forexample,itisimpossibletodeterminetodaywhatpercentage ofinboundparticipantstomeetingsofinternationalorganisationstoBarcelonaarevisiting due to the hosting of the Olympic Games in 1992. Even empirical research cannot help, because today’s conference organisers do not host their meetings in Barcelona as a result of the hosting of the Olympics in 1992 but as a result of the attractiveness of the city as well as of the improvement of the congress and hotel facilities. In 2006, Barcelona was ranked number 3 in the world, attracting 68,148 participants to meetings (ICCA, 2007, p. 33). However, it is impossible to discern how much more attractive Barcelona has become for international organisations as a result of the Olympics and what alternative projects would have been undertaken without the Olympic Games? The most urgent requirement, therefore, in developing a full understanding of the legacies of mega sport events for the tourism sector, is further research that attempts to develop approaches and methodologies to address these obstacles to the measurement of mega sport event tourism legacies. Acknowledgements Thanks have to be given to Mike Collins (University of Gloucester, UK) for giving me the initial idea for this paper. To Mike Weed (Canterbury Christ Church University, Journal of Sport & Tourism 223 UK) for all the fruitful discussions on tourism legacy and to Lamartine DaCosta (Rio de Janairo, Brazil) for broadening my view on legacy. Finally, I thank the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. References Baade, R.A., & Matheson, V. (2002). 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